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challenges: (a) defining the timing of local housing booms in a non-ad hoc way; (b) addressing
specification search bias that arises when only one aggregate series is used to estimate both the
timing of the housing boom and the magnitude of price volatility during that period; and (c)
controlling for common variation in economic conditions. We find strong evidence of contagion
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average. Estimated elasticities are greater when transmitted from a larger to a smaller market,
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I.

Introduction

One of the striking features of the recent U.S. housing cycle is its heterogeneity across
markets. Both the magnitudes and timing of price swings varied greatly across metropolitan
areas (Sinai (2012)). Figure 1 plots the geography and timing of the start of housing booms at
the metropolitan area level from 1993 to 2009 based on estimates reported in Ferreira and
Gyourko (2011).1 The top left panel marks the 15 primarily rust belt and interior markets that
never boomed. The other panels show that the remaining markets boomed at very different times
over a nearly decade-long period from 1997-2005 and that the timing of these booms was nonrandom. The housing boom spread from what were initially highly concentrated areas on the
two coasts, with the earliest booms beginning between 1997-1999 in California and the mid-New
England region. On the west coast, housing booms eventually spread inland towards central
California and to neighboring states to the east and north. On the east coast, housing booms
spread to other markets in New England and then to neighboring regions, eventually reaching the
majority of Florida markets by 2004 and 2005. These patterns are suggestive of spillover effects
that disseminate positive housing price shocks from one market to another.
In this paper we investigate whether such spillovers were an important element of the last
American housing cycle and also directly test which mechanisms may have contributed to them.
In the financial economics literature, a spillover of this type is often referred to as contagion
when it is found following a negative shock to one or more countries or markets.2 While we
focus on spillovers from a positive shock in much of the paper, we use the terms spillover and
contagion interchangeably in order to emphasize the close intellectual linkage of our work with
the analysis of contagion in financial economics. We define contagion as the price correlation
across space between two different housing markets following a shock to one market that is
above and beyond that which can be justified by common aggregate trends.3

1

They define the beginning of a metropolitan area’s housing boom by the quarter in which there is a structural break
(a discrete positive jump in this case) in the market’s house price appreciation rate. This methodology and the
rationale behind it are discussed more fully below in Section II.
2
See Forbes (2012) for an excellent recent review of that literature, and Dungey, et. al. (2005) for a more technical
analysis of the challenges involved in convincingly estimating contagion or spillover effects. Previous work on
financial market contagion includes studies of the 1987 U.S. stock market crash (King and Wadhwani (1990); Lee
and Kim (1993)), the 1994 Mexican peso crisis (Calvart and Reinhart (1996)), and the Hong Kong stock market and
Asian currency crisis of 1997 (Corsetti, et. al. (2005)).
3
There is no single, agreed-upon definition of contagion, but our definition is similar in spirit to many used in the
financial economics literature. See, for example, Forbes (2012), which emphasizes the distinction between
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The nature of the housing market and richness of our data allow us to address several
empirical concerns that plague previous contagion-related research. One example involves the
determination of the relevant period(s) in which to study spillovers. For example, a non-ad hoc
procedure for identifying the timing of a shock is preferred to an arbitrary choice of time period
‘after the fact’. This typically is not feasible in most studies of stock market or currency crises
because there is little or no variation across countries in the onset of those events. Fortunately,
this was not the case during the most recent housing cycle which saw substantial variation across
markets (Ferreira and Gyourko (2011); Sinai (2012)). In addition, we are able to appeal to
existing theory as a guide in helping to determine how to time the beginning of a local boom. As
is described more fully in the next section, implications of Glaeser et. al.’s (2012) dynamic
version of the classic model of spatial equilibrium in urban economics lead us to date the
beginning of a given market’s boom by whether and when there was a structural break in that
area’s price appreciation rate. These estimates were shown in Figure 1 and provide us with
substantial variation in the timing of the start of local market booms that can be used in testing
for the existence of contagion.
A second advantage is provided by the use of a voluminous micro-level data on U.S.
housing transactions.4 We have over 23 million observations on individual home sales in 99
metropolitan areas dating back to the early 1990s in most cases. This data enables us to address
specification search bias of the type identified by Leamer (1978), which arises when the same
data is used to identify both the timing of a shock and the magnitude of the volatility during that
period. Our strategy uses randomly split samples to separately identify the timing of booms and
the magnitude of price volatility in those periods.5 Most contagion studies in financial
economics are not able to deal with this issue because they use a single aggregate stock index in
each country. Doing so increases the likelihood of falsely concluding that there are more and
bigger booms (or crisis periods in the financial economics literature) than truly exist.
Third, the richness of our data and the variation in the timing of booms across markets
also helps us deal with omitted variable biases in several ways. We use the time line of a
contagion and interdependence, with the latter term reflecting when events in one country affect others in all states
of the world, not just after severe negative events.
4
The property transaction data is collected by Dataquick or by intermediaries from county assessor’s offices
captures the universe of sales.
5
This is the same strategy followed by Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) in their study of tipping points in residential
segregation models.
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neighbor’s boom as our source of variation in the data to identify contagion effects. Our baseline
specification involves regressing a focal market’s price changes on a series of indicators
reflecting whether the relevant neighboring market is booming and how proximate a given
period is in time to the start of that market’s boom.6 The added degrees of freedom afforded by
the multiple, non-contemporaneous booms we observe also allow us to control for omitted
factors that might reflect common economic shocks. We do so through the inclusion of time by
census division dummies, lagged price changes, as well as a host of local fundamentals. We also
are able to address the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) critique regarding heteroskedasticity, whereby
increased volatility in the ‘crisis period’ (when the boom starts, in our context) generates upward
bias in correlation coefficients across markets. We adjust for the volatility in prices being higher
than normal when the boom starts by directly controlling for the time line of the focal market’s
boom. Finally, in an alternative specification, we also address the potential for reverse causality
with an instrumental variable approach using further lags of close neighbor’s price changes.
Our main conclusion is that contagion played a statistically and economically significant
role in the development of the most recent housing boom. The elasticity of prices in a typical
focal market with respect to those in the closest metropolitan area in the year following the
beginning of the boom in that neighboring area ranges from 0.10 to 0.27.7 Empirically, the upper
end of our elasticity range implies that from one-fourth to one-third of the average jump in price
growth at the start of a typical local boom was due to contagion effects. This average impact is
driven entirely by the physically closest neighbor and is only detected if the nearest neighbor had
a statistically significant housing boom. There is no evidence of spillovers on prices arising from
more geographically distant markets. In addition, this impact does not vary materially with the
number of miles between the focal market and its nearest neighbor. As a robustness check, we
investigated whether there is evidence of contagion on the extensive margin. Hazard models
show that the probability of a boom beginning this quarter is indeed influenced by close metros
that boomed in the previous quarter.

6

As expected, this is very important empirically. Naively regressing ‘price on price’ yields contagion estimates that
are 3-5 times larger than the results we report below from our preferred specification.
7
We also report evidence of on-going contagion effects as the boom builds, but those results are potentially
confounded by feedback effects. This is not a concern at the start of local booms because the data show no pretrends, with markets appearing to be on their equilibrium paths before the initial jump in price growth when the
booms commenced.

4

We also investigated heterogeneity in the price contagion along a number of other nondistance related dimensions. For example, one might expect contagion to be stronger when the
transmission is from larger neighbor to a smaller focal market. That is precisely what we find.
The magnitude of the contagion effect also varies with the elasticity of supply of the focal
metropolitan area. Specifically, there is no evidence of contagion in inelastically supplied
markets, but the estimated impact in the most elastically supplied markets is double the average
effect discussed above.
What mechanisms could explain the observed price contagion effect? Fundamental
factors including local income, migration flows between focal and neighboring markets, lending
behavior in both markets, and speculative behavior in the focal market, do not show much
variation after the beginning of the boom of the nearest neighbor. We also include a simple form
of expectations of these local market fundamentals in our main econometric model to see if this
materially affects the magnitude of the estimated contagion effect. It does not. This indicates
that at least some of the contagion we estimate may be due to forces not related to the
fundamentals analyzed in this paper. This has potentially important implications for policy
makers. To the extent that the spread of a housing boom is even partially due to nonfundamental forces (e.g., some type of irrational exuberance or otherwise mistaken perceptions
of the influence of a neighboring market), it may be worth rethinking the advisability of policy
makers not responding to a boom.
Despite finding important spillovers during the run up of the U.S. housing boom, we
report mixed evidence that contagion played a role in the bust. Estimated elasticities are zero at
the beginning of the bust, but they increase to about 0.15 by the third year of the housing bust of
the nearest neighbor. We also cannot detect any impact of contagion on the extensive margin
during the bust. This is perhaps not all that surprising since the timing of the bust across MSAs
is heavily concentrated in an 18 month period during 2006 and 2007, while the buildup of the
housing boom took almost a decade. This highlights difficulties in detecting spillovers during
economic or financial crashes/booms that quickly spread across countries, regions, or firms.8

8

In addition, we do not have the added advantage of relying on a prediction from external theory to date the
beginning of the bust. In this part of the analysis, we follow the tradition in the contagion literature and date the
bust’s beginning in an ad hoc manner based on the assumption that it begins in the quarter after nominal price levels
peaked in a given metropolitan area.

5

While our research is motivated by prior research in financial economics noted above, it
is also part of a growing body of work on the most recent housing cycle. One important strand
of that research tries to understand whether the most recent cycle was a bubble.9 Another more
voluminous body of papers analyzes the bust and its consequences.10 There are also some prior
studies of price spillovers in the housing market.11 In this paper we focus on one particular facet
of the cycle, the role of contagion, but contribute to the literature by: a) looking at contagion
over the full time span of the cycle, b) improving empirical identification in many respects, c)
estimating heterogeneity in the contagion elasticity, and d) investigating the potential causes of
contagion across housing markets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section motivates our use of an urban
economic approach to analyzing contagion in housing markets and discusses our method for
dating the beginning of the boom. Section III then describes the various data sources employed
and the variables created. Section IV discusses the different types of specifications estimated,
reports results, and explores potential mechanisms that might explain the contagion effects. In
Section V we estimate alternative specifications, look at the extensive margin of contagion, and
whether we can find contagion at the housing bust. There is a brief conclusion.

II.

An Urban Economic Motivation and Definition of Contagion

9

Shiller (Chapter 2, 2005) provides perhaps the most famous characterization of the boom as a non-rational event.
Others recently have estimated rational expectations general equilibrium models to try to explain the national
aggregate price data (e.g., Favilukis, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011)) or the serial correlation and
volatility of prices and quantities within and across metropolitan areas (e.g., Glaeser et al. (2012)). Related work
includes Arce and Lopez-Salido (2011), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Lai and Van Order (2010), and
Wheaton and Nechayev (2008).
10
Much of this research focuses on the subprime sector (e.g., Bajari, Chu and Park (2008), Danis and PenningtonCross (2008), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Gerardi, Shapiro and Willen (2007), Goetzmann, Peng and Yen
(2009). Mayer and Pence (2008), Haughwout, et. al. (2011)), mortgage securitization (e.g., Bubb and Kaufman
(2009), Keys et. al. (2010)), the default/foreclosure crisis (e.g., Adelino, Gerardi and Willen (2009), Campbell,
Giglio and Pathak (2011), Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008), Gerardi et. al. (2008), Mayer, Pence and Sherlund
(2009), Mian and Sufi (2009), Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010), Piskorski, Seru and Vig (2009)) or the role of
government regulation (e.g., Avery and Brevoort (2010), Bhutta (2009), Ho and Pennington-Cross (2008)).
11
Some early examples include Clapp, et al. (1995) and Dolde and Tirtiroglu (1997), who use data on towns in
Connecticut and San Francisco (respectively) to test for the existence of cross-market linkages in price movements.
More recently, Holly, et al. (2010, 2011) use data on U.S. states and U.K. regions to study the spatial and temporal
diffusion of changes in house prices during the most recent cycle. Fuss, et. al. (2011) and Cotter, et. al. (2011) use
publicly available, metropolitan area-level house price series to test for the existence of some form of contagion
during the most recent housing cycle. However, all studies use of the same aggregate market-level price data to
determine both the timing of the crisis period and to measure the magnitude of volatility changes during that period
makes their estimates susceptible to specification search bias. In addition, the timing of the shock is usually defined
in an ad-hoc way and there are questions about how that research deals with omitted factors.
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II.a. Timing of local housing booms
Any analysis of possible contagion effects in the spreading of the recent housing boom
first requires knowledge of the timing of the beginning of the boom in different markets. Our
data on the timeline of local booms come from estimates discussed above and reported in
Ferreira and Gyourko (2011). In that work, the start of local booms is determined by when there
was a structural break in each area’s price appreciation rate series. The justification for that
strategy is based on implications of the dynamic spatial equilibrium model developed in Glaeser,
et al. (2012). In particular, that model implies that in steady state each local market will exhibit
constant and continuous growth paths for house prices, new construction and population.12
Empirically, this means that we should see house prices in a given market growing at a
constant rate unless there is a shock to local productivity, amenities, or expectations, in which
case we would then observe a discrete jump in the appreciation rate for that market. The data are
generally consistent with this predicted pattern. As a particularly stark example, Figure 2 plots
annualized house price appreciation rates over time for the Las Vegas market. This graph shows
that fast-growing market to be appreciating at a high, but roughly constant rate for many years
before house price growth escalates sharply at the beginning of its boom. Informally, our
approach defines the beginning of the housing boom in a local market as the point at which
house price growth rates exhibit this type of discrete jump.
To formalize this idea, we start with the following reduced form model of house price
growth in MSA at time :
1
Glaeser, et. al. (2012) implies that

,
,

,
,

,

,

1, … , .

for all if the market is on its steady-state growth

path. However, if there is a shock to local productivity, amenities, or expectations at time then
the price growth rate will exhibit a discrete jump in that period. The beginning of a local housing
12

Glaeser, et. al. (2012) introduce dynamics into Rosen’s (1979) and Roback’s (1982) classic static model of sptial
equilibrium. In this compensating differential framework, house prices (Pi) are the entry fee paid to access the
wages (Wi, which reflect productivity) and amenities (Ai) of labor market area i. Their model is closed with an
assumption that there is some elastically supplied reference market area which is always open to another household.
The utility level available in the reference market is given by U*, and establishes the lower bound on utility
provided in any market. In the long run, perfect mobility ensures that U* is achieved in all markets, so that in
equilibrium, no one has an incentive to move to another place which offers higher utility. A very simple, linear
version of this framework would imply that U* = Wi + Ai – Pi, so that dPi = dWi + dAi in equilibrium. The steady
state rate of price appreciation need not be zero. Secular trends in house prices can come from an underlying trend
in housing demand as long as the market is not in perfectly elastic supply. It can also arise from trends in physical
construction costs under certain conditions.
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boom can thus be identified by testing for the existence of one or more structural breaks in the
parameter

. To carry out this test we follow well-established methods in the time series

,

literature for estimating structural breaks.
Borrowing heavily from Estrella’s (2003) notation, the null hypothesis is that

is

,

constant for the entire sample period
:
The alternative is that

,

,

,

1, … .

changes at some proportion, 0

,

1, of the sample which marks

the beginning of a housing boom in market i. Specifically the alternative hypothesis is
:
For any given

,
,

,

,

,

1, … ,
1, … , .

, it is straightforward to carry out this hypothesis test. However, things are

slightly more complicated when

is unknown and the determination of its value is the primary

interest, as the case here.
and assess its statistical significance, let Π

To see how we estimate the value of
,

,

,

be a closed interval in 0,1 and let
to

,

,

break point is the value
of

∗

, where

∙ denotes rounding to the nearest integer. The estimated

from the set

that maximizes the likelihood ratio statistic from a test

.13 That is, for every ∈

against

corresponding to a test of

be the set of all observations from

against

we construct the likelihood ratio statistic

for that value of , and we take the that produces the

largest test-statistic as our estimated break point for MSA i.
Assessing the statistical significance of this breakpoint estimate requires knowing the
distribution of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic as calculated from among the values
in

. Let

denote this supremum. Andrews (1993) shows that this distribution can

be written as
2

where ‖

‖

‖
∈Π

‖ is the Bessel process of order 1,

/

/

,

1

,

/

,

1

,

,

, and

13

We use the terms supremum and maximum interchangeably in this exposition. Technically, all of the results are in
terms of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic.

8

1 ′
1

1

.

Direct calculation of the probability in (2) is non-trivial and prior research has relied on
approximations that are typically based on simulation or curve-fitting methods (Andrews (1993),
Hansen (1997)). However, Estrella (2003) provides a numerical procedure for calculating exact
p-values that does not rely on these types of approximations. We use this method to calculate pvalues for the estimated break point,

, for each MSA in the sample.

Note that this method does not provide an unbiased estimate of the magnitude of the
change in price growth rates at the breakpoint,
break point, the estimate of

,

,

. Under the null hypothesis that there is no

has a nonstandard distribution and OLS estimates of its

magnitude will be upwardly biased in absolute value. This problem can lead to an increased
chance of falsely concluding that

,

0 and is a form of specification search bias arising from

the fact that the same data is being used to estimate both the timing and the magnitude of the
structural break.
Several approaches for adjusting the estimate of the magnitude of structural break have
been suggested and are typically based on simulations of the distribution of

,

under the null

hypothesis of no break point (Andrews (1993), Hansen (2000)). Our approach to correcting the
estimates of

,

follows the recently suggested method used by Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008)

of randomly splitting the underlying sample of housing transactions into two and using one
sample to estimate the timing of the boom and the other to estimate the magnitude of price
changes around that time. The idea is that if the two subsamples are independent, then estimates
of

,

from the second sample, which was not used to estimate the location of the break point,

will have a standard distribution even under the null hypothesis of no structural break in the first
sample. In practice, we randomly split our sample of unique houses into two and create separate
price growth series for each sample of houses. The first price series is used to estimate the
timing of the boom following the method just discussed, while the second is used to analyze the
magnitude of price changes following housing booms in neighboring markets.14
14

Not accounting for this issue can result in large biases. Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008) noted that their estimates
from the full sample were somewhat larger than the estimates from the split sample approach. In our case, if we use
the full sample of transactions to estimate both the timing of the beginning of the boom and the magnitude of the
jump in price growth at that time, the estimated jumps are almost X% larger, on average, than those arising out of

9

The procedure above will generate a breakpoint estimate regardless of whether the
structural break represents a positive or negative change in the price growth rate. In the cases
where the estimated break point is either insignificant or implies a negative change in growth
rates, we conclude that the market did not have a boom. That is the case for the 15 interior
markets shown in the first panel of Figure 1. For those locations where we do find evidence of a
statistically significant and positive break point, we also test for the existence of two breaks
against the null hypothesis of only one. To do so, we closely follow Bai (1999) and Bai and
Perron (1998) and we refer the reader to Appendix A1 for the details of this procedure. About
half of the MSAs were found to have experienced more than one structural break. However, for
many of those cases, the secondary breaks were either small economically or not significantly
different from zero. The estimation of a secondary break generally does not displace the location
of the main structural break either. Moreover, comparison of histograms of timing of local
booms based on one-break or two-break methods lead to similar distributions of local booms
over time. Given these facts, we simplify our analysis by only using the one-break method in the
empirical study below. When necessary, we also report robustness tests based on the multiple
break method.

II.b. Contagion in local markets
A potential role for neighbors to influence house price growth in a focal market arises
naturally within the dynamic urban model of spatial equilibrium referenced above. While users
of that framework typically presume that shocks originate from own market fundamentals, they
could arise from neighboring markets as well. In our case, we are interested in whether
neighbors that just had housing booms influence housing market outcomes in the focal
metropolitan area, all else constant. Note that any such contagion effects could arise from
fundamental or behavioral factors.
An example of a fundamental factor generating spatial spillovers is a positive industry or
income shock that triggers a housing boom in a local labor market. For example, if there is such
a shock in the Silicon Valley, house prices in the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara MSA will
increase in the short run given supply constraints, and perhaps start a housing boom.
the split sample estimation. Part of this difference, of course, could also be attributed to additional random variation
that arises when reducing sample sizes by half. This may be an issue for our smaller cities that do not have as many
transactions per quarter as the big cities, and are more subject to the influence of potential outliers.
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Neighboring areas, such as the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont MSA (or smaller, but more
distant, metropolitan areas in the central valley of California), may eventually benefit from that
positive income shock, as some of the Silicon Valley jobs could migrate to nearby areas. Even
though such fundamental spillovers may occur with lags, house prices in the neighboring
markets should immediately capitalize the expectation of future economic growth.
Housing market shocks could also be disseminated through the credit market channel. In
the example above, Silicon Valley lenders may achieve extra profits since foreclosures and
delinquencies tend to decline during an economic boom. If those lenders decide to reinvest
profits and expand market shares in a nearby MSA – possibly because it is less costly to expand
business to nearby communities – then the San Francisco metro may observe a shift in the
availability of credit, which will boost its housing market both in the short and long runs.15 A
similar mechanism could exist for land owners and housing investors in the Silicon Valley.
Their wealth increases after the beginning of the Silicon Valley housing boom, which could
trigger an expansion of investments into neighboring MSAs.16
Spillovers could arise even in the absence of expected future fundamental changes in San
Francisco or the central valley. Residents in those neighboring markets may be right to think
that some type of positive income spillover will occur from the Silicon Valley boom, but they
may incorrectly predict its magnitude. Those biased expectations can lead to short-run increases
in their housing prices.17 In addition to this type of behavior, irrational factors may lead
residents in the focal market to have not only incorrect, but also non-fundamentally based
expectations about future price growth in their market following a shock to a nearby neighboring
area. Finally, the housing boom in the Silicon Valley may generate another type of behavioral
spillover effect—namely, an increase in Silicon Valley housing prices may lead its own local
residents to pay more attention to what is happening in neighboring markets, such as the city of

15

Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) show how increases in the availability of credit to marginal buyers can lead to
overreaction in house prices.
16
Chinco and Mayer (2012) report that out of town speculators played a significant role in the housing boom and
that their presence may have exacerbated price increases in some markets. Bayer et al. (2011) similarly document
the rise of speculative activity during the housing boom.
17
A similar mechanism underlies the analysis in King and Wadhwani (1990) who document that contagion in
financial markets can arise as a result of attempts by rational agents to infer information from price changes in other
markets. Similarly, Clapp et al. (1995) document characteristics of house price dynamics that could be consistent
with rational learning. Burnside et al. (2011) and Favara and Song (2011) show how the presence of optimistic
agents in the housing market can lead to increases in house price levels and volatility.
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San Francisco. Therefore, a shock that makes the focal housing market and its interactions with
neighbors more salient to investors may itself lead to stronger contagion.
Regardless of its source, contagion would manifest itself in the form of abnormally large
increases in focal market price growth rates immediately following a boom in a neighboring
market. Our empirical approach makes use of the estimates of the timing of local booms
discussed above in order to test for this type of spillover and its potential mechanisms. However,
before discussing the econometric specifications we estimate, we first give a brief description of
the data underlying our analysis.

III.

Data

Our house price data come from DataQuick, a private data vendor which collects the
universe of housing transactions from county recorder’s offices in markets across the country.
The sample used is for 99 metropolitan areas, with information on over 23 million individual
observations ranging from the first quarter of 1993 (1993(1)) through the third quarter of 2009
(2009(3)). We randomly split the sample into two and in each subsample we create a constant
quality quarterly price index for each MSA. 18 From these indices we create the annualized
growth series used in estimating the timing of the boom and in assessing how neighboring booms
affect price growth in focal markets. The mean, standard deviation, and interquartile range for
the price index we use to measure magnitudes are reported in the first row of Table 1.
We also create a number of variables to measure fundamentals that are potentially
correlated with house price growth and the timing of the beginning of local housing booms.
These are reported in subsequent rows of Table 1. We consider three types of fundamentals: (1)
demand shifters, such as the average income of mortgage applicants, MSA-level unemployment
rates, and net migration flows; (2) buyer characteristics and property traits, including the
percentage of speculators, the percentage of minority buyers and the average square footage of
transacted housing units; and (3) credit market conditions, measured by the average loan-to-

18

We create a MSA-level constant quality house price series by quarter using hedonic regressions. Price, in
logarithmic form, is modeled as a function of the square footage of the home entered in quadratic form, the number
of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, and the age of the home. We also created a version of the Case and Shiller
(1987) repeat sales price index for 14 Case-Shiller markets that overlap with the DataQuick files, and found that the
simple correlation of appreciation rates on the two different indexes based on DataQuick is usually higher than 0.9.
We employ hedonic price indexes because their data requirements are much less onerous.
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value ratio of home purchases, the percentage of mortgages originated by subprime lenders and
those insured by the FHA.
To construct many of the demographic measures of home buyers, we merge the
DataQuick files with Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, which provide information
on the income and race of all mortgage applicants. In each time period, we calculate the average
income of all local loan applicants as reported in HMDA. Similarly, the “Percent Minority”
variable reflects the fraction of African-American and Hispanic loan applicants as coded in the
HMDA files. Because these measures reflect the characteristics of all mortgage applicants, and
not only the set who end up purchasing a home, we take them to be an accurate description of the
race and income of potential homebuyers in each market.
MSA-level unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area
Unemployment Statistics series, and net migration flows are calculated using data on county-tocounty migration patterns provided on an annual basis by the Internal Revenue Service.
“Percent speculators” refers to the fraction of transactions involving a speculator on
either the buyer or the seller side of the transaction. We leverage the fact that we observe the
names of both the buyer and seller for each transaction in order to define speculators in a similar
way as Bayer, et al. (2011). Specifically we define a person as a speculator if he or she is
observed to have ‘flipped’ at least two homes in the same metropolitan area during the entire
course of the sample where a flip is defined as a purchase and sale of the same home within a
two-year period. We then consider all transactions in which that person is involved as either the
buyer or seller as being “speculative”.
Credit market variables include the average loan-to-value ratio (LTV) among
homebuyers in DataQuick, the fraction of FHA-insured loans, and the fraction of subprime loans.
We use information on the names of the underlying mortgage lenders from the DataQuick files
to calculate the share of subprime loans. More specifically, we obtained lists of the top twenty
subprime lenders from 1990-onward in a publication now called Inside Mortgage Finance.19
“Percent subprime lenders” is then defined as the share of mortgages issued by these top twenty
lenders.
19

This publication claims to capture up to 85% of all subprime originations in most years. Previously, it was named
B&C Mortgage Finance. See Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) for more details on these lenders and
lists. Other papers such as Mian and Sufi (2009) and Keys, et al. (2010) have access to micro-level FICO scores and
use that to define subprime borrowers.
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IV.

Econometric model and estimates

A. Econometric Model
As discussed in Section II, the implications of the underlying dynamic model of urban
economics are readily extended to include shocks from neighboring housing markets. We
estimate the following reduced form model to gauge the impact of housing market booms of
close neighbors on the prices of the focal MSA m in Census Division d and quarter t:
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The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) contains the primary variables of interest,
the

,

’s, which are indicators for the years relative to the beginning of the housing boom (r) of

the closest neighboring market (neighbor number 1). The coefficients,

, on these indicator

variables describe how prices in the focal market evolve over the course of its nearest neighbor’s
housing boom. We define Relative Year 0 to be the 12-month period prior to the beginning of the
neighboring market’s boom.20 Relative year 1 then includes the quarter in which the boom starts
as well as the subsequent three quarters. Relative years from -2 to +3 are entered individually,
with all relative years greater (less) than those numbers binned together.21 This allows us to see
whether there are any important pre-trends and to track the build-up of the boom after it starts.
The second term on the right-hand side of (3) includes an analogous set of controls, denoted

,

for the second closest neighbor. In a set of robustness tests presented below, we also control for
log prices of other near MSAs, to make sure that our elasticity estimates from the nearest
neighbor are not confounded by other neighbors, or other neighboring shocks.

20

We work with 12 month periods because there is noise in the quarterly data that is not due solely to error in the
estimation of the break point. For example, it is common for there to be at least a one quarter difference between the
time that a transactions price is agreed upon and when the actual closing occurs. In addition, we know that prices in
housing markets do not follow a random walk, but move slowly and are strongly positively correlated over short
horizons (Case and Shiller (1987, 1989)). Locations for which we do not estimate a statistically significant boom are
still assigned a relative year according to their estimated break points.
21
We did estimate all our models with lengthier spans of individual relative years controlled for, but they did not
yield any new insights beyond those reported below.
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Physical proximity is the most natural measure of distance, and the specifications
reported below assign the nearest neighbor based on the number of miles between the centroids
of the relevant metropolitan areas.22 We also experimented with a measure of proximity based
on migration flows between pairs of markets. Those results were qualitatively and quantitatively
similar, so we do not report them for space reasons. 23
This specification also controls for the time line of the focal market’s boom via the third
term on the right-hand side of equation (3). By including the relative year effects of the focal
MSA (denoted

,

, where the absence of a superscript indicates the variable refers to the focal

market itself), we control for the average increase in prices of the focal market over the course of
its own boom. This vector serves a similar role to the adjustments made in related financial
economics research to deal with upward bias in contagion estimates arising from volatility being
higher in all markets during ‘crisis’ periods (e.g., Forbes and Rigobon (2002)).
The remaining terms of equation (3) include four quarterly lags of (log) focal market
prices to control for potentially unobserved time-varying characteristics of MSA m24, as well as
Census Division-by-quarter fixed effects to deal with common regional shocks that might
influence close neighbors simultaneously. Finally, note that we do not control for
contemporaneous focal market fundamentals in this baseline specification. This is because they
could represent intermediate outcomes through which the contagion effect may be operating. In
the mechanisms section below, we will directly estimate the impact of the neighbor’s housing
boom on those intermediate outcomes, and also test whether their inclusion in equation (3)
mitigates the contagion effect.
B. Main estimates
22

Distances are calculated using the full set of MSAs according to the 2000 Census. Because we only have price
data for 99 of these MSAs, some data for nearest neighbors remain empty in 24 cases. In our regressions, we create
an indicator for whether we have price data for the nearest neighbor, and interact this indicator with the relevant
relative years. The results are qualitatively similar when we drop MSAs with missing neighbors’ price data and also
when we calculate distances using only the 75 MSAs for which we have data.
23
This economic measure of distance based on migration flows between metropolitan areas has been used in other
research (Sinai and Souleles (2009)). It is strongly positively correlated with geographic distance between markets.
For example, the probability of the physically closest neighbor also being the closest economic neighbor is 57%, and
the probability it is one of the two closest economic neighbors is 76%. Hence, it is not surprising these two
measures of distance yield similar results.
24
We also considered specifications that dispense with the lags of the dependent variable in favor of MSA fixed
effects. Results from these specifications are qualitatively similar. However, we believe that the lagged dependent
variable specification is more appropriate given that omitted time-varying common factors are more likely to
confound the contagion effect than unobservable but fixed MSA-specific characteristics.
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Column 1 of Table 2 reports baseline estimates of equation (3) for the metropolitan areas
whose nearest neighbors had statistically significant booms. The reported coefficients show that
prices were relatively stable in the three years prior to the beginning of the boom in the nearest
neighboring MSA, so that there is no evidence of a pre-trend. In the year that the neighboring
MSA begins its boom (Relative Year [1]), focal market prices then jump 0.87 percentage points
and remain almost 1% higher for another couple of years. Column 2 reports the analogous
coefficients on the relative year dummies for the set of neighboring MSAs for which we do not
estimate a statistically significant or positive break point. These results confirm that a positive
effect is only detected when the neighboring MSA actually had a housing boom. Hence, we find
spillovers on focal market prices only if the nearest neighbor actually experienced a significantly
positive shock. Columns 3 and 4 show analogous estimates for the second closest neighbors.
The coefficients on the timeline of the boom for 2nd nearest neighbor generally are not
statistically different from zero regardless of whether this particular neighbor had a housing
boom. Hence spillovers mostly arise from the closest neighbor, and we will focus on those
results in the remaining of the paper.25
In order to determine the elasticity of focal market housing price growth with respect to
near neighbors’ price growth, we need to gauge the magnitude of the housing boom for the
nearest neighbors. The starting point of this exercise is to estimate a version of equation (3) that
uses the log price of the nearest neighbor as the dependent variable. Table 3 reports those results.
Pre-boom prices are trending down a bit in these results, and then jump 3% in the first year of the
housing boom. By the third year of the boom, prices are 8% higher than the pre-boom period,
and are more than 11% higher in subsequent years.26
An upper bound on the implied elasticity can be computed by using only the estimates of
price changes in the first year of the boom under the assumption that agents in these markets are
myopic. Combining these figures with the estimates from Table 2 yields an elasticity of 0.27.27

25

If we do not control for the time line of the focal market’s boom, the point estimates of the nearest neighbor’s
contagion effects are about 20% higher than those reported just below for our baseline specification in Table 2.
However, the results are not statistically different once the standard errors are taken into account. While this is
consistent with price volatility being artificially high when the focal market itself is booming, we note that including
these indicators could also be controlling for intermediate outcomes.
26
These magnitudes are similar to those in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) who conduct a similar exercise using the
full set of MSAs, not just those who serve as closest neighbors to some other MSA in the sample.
27
This is the result of dividing the 0.008688 spillover estimate from column 1 of Table 2 by 0.03224 from column 1
of Table 3.
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Smaller elasticities result if we consider cumulative price changes by the third year of the shock.
In that case, the elasticity falls to about 0.10.
While differences in data and methodologies make it difficult to directly compare our
estimates of contagion to others in the literature, our magnitudes appear to be smaller and we
find that spillovers only arise from the closest neighbors.28 We suspect this is partially due to
our empirical strategy that minimizes specification search bias and includes various controls to
deal with omitted factors related to common shocks.
A rough gauge of the relative importance of contagion in fomenting local booms can be
made as follows. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) concluded that jumps in one fundamental, local
income growth, could account for one-half of the magnitude of the jump in price growth at the
beginning of local booms (on average). Our estimates indicate that contagion did not play as
important a role, but it still was economically meaningful, as it can account for over one-quarter
of the jump at the start of the boom.29 Using different and more conservative figures and
assumptions reduce the share, but nothing reasonable can drive it below 10%.30
Finally, the economic interpretation of the contagion estimates for the years after the
beginning of the boom may be more complicated due to potential feedback effects. Feedback
effects are less of a concern in the first year of the boom, as we showed that prices, roughly
speaking, are in equilibrium right before that moment. It may not play a major role in
subsequent years either, especially if only 10% or less of the main price effect propagates across
close neighbors. Nonetheless, contagion estimates for relative years two and three, for example,
are better thought of as reduced form estimates that include the impact of recent contagion, but

28

For example, Cotter et al. (2011) regress housing price appreciation in eleven MSAs near San Francisco on the
contemporaneous and 3 quarterly lags of San Francisco’s housing appreciation rate and report coefficients ranging
from 0.05-0.67 on lagged housing price appreciation of San Francisco. Fuss et al. (2011) model the volatility
spillover intensity and suggest that a 1 percentage point shock in housing return in Las Vegas could result in an
eventual 0.19 percentage point increase in housing return in San Diego.
29
To see this more clearly, start with the 0.27 elasticity just discussed. Given the 3.2% average jump in Relative
Year [1] reported in Table 3, that aforementioned elasticity implies that about 0.9 points, or about 27 percent of the
jump at the start of the boom, can be explained by contagion.
30
It is not clear what figure to use for the average level of price growth in the denominator of this ratio, which is
why we focus more on the elasticity. The 3.2% number used here based on Table 3’s results is close to the log price
changes reported in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011). However, one also could use the 6.5% average jump in price
growth rate (not the change in the log prices) also reported by those authors. That number arises from an estimate
that does not control for any year or metropolitan area fixed effects. With that denominator, the 0.9 points amounts
to about 14% of the jump at the start of the boom. As noted in the text, there are no reasonable assumptions one
could make that drive the share below 10%.
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that also embed a share of contagion from the complete path of price appreciation since the
beginning of the boom.
C. Heterogeneity in the Contagion Effect
We test for heterogeneity in the average contagion effect along a number of dimensions.
The first is distance. We already found that only the nearest neighbor matters. A natural
extension is to ask whether the strength of the contagion impact associated with the closest
neighbor increases with its proximity to its focal market. The first two columns of Table 4 show
that the answer is no. Those figures are the output from a regression like that in equation (3)
which further interacts the neighbor’s relative year dummies with an indicator for whether that
neighbor is more or less than the median distance of about 40 miles away from the focal market.
Although the estimates tend to be imprecise, the point estimates show little difference between
relatively close and farther away nearest neighbors, especially around the time when the
neighbor’s boom begins. Thus, contagion effects arise only from the nearest neighbor, but they
do not vary materially based on how close that nearest neighbor is.31
It also seems natural to ask whether contagion impacts depend upon the relative sizes of
the focal and neighbor markets. To investigate this, we classified focal MSAs whose population
sizes are within 50% of the population of the closest neighbor as being of similar size. They are
considered larger if they have at least 50% more population, and smaller if they have less than
50% of the population of the closest neighbor. Appendix Figure 2 shows the distribution of
relative population size, and the thresholds used to determine groups of MSAs for both
geographic and economic neighbors. The estimates reported in the third and fourth columns of
Table 4 indicate that the contagion effect on a focal market is larger if the nearest neighbor is
substantially bigger than the focal area. Prices in the focal market are 1.3% higher immediately
when the large near neighbor booms, but are little changed when the focal market is bigger (row
3 for Relative Year [1]). Prices stay higher in subsequent years for focal markets being
influenced by large neighbors. In sum, size does matter and in an intuitive way in the sense that

31

The interquartile range of distances between neighboring markets runs from 30-48 miles, so there is not much
variation for much of the sample. The mean is larger at 74 miles, but that reflects the influence of Honolulu, whose
nearest neighbor is over 2,000 miles away. The next biggest distance is 111 miles. We also experimented with
alternative groupings such as dividing markets into whether their nearest neighbor was less than 30 miles away,
from 36-60 miles away, and greater than 60 miles away. The results were no different from those reported here.
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contagion effects are much larger (and consistently statistically significant) if the nearest
neighbor is large relative to the focal market.
The final dimension along which we investigated whether there was any heterogeneity
was by the degree of the focal market’s elasticity of housing supply. For this test, we split the
focal MSAs into three groups according to the supply elasticities provided by Saiz (2010).32
Results are reported in the final two columns of Table 4 for the bottom third (supply inelastic)
and top third (supply elastic) groups. Note that prices do not jump when the closest neighbor of
an inelastically-supplied market begins to boom. However, for the most elastically-supplied
metros, prices in the focal market are about 2% higher if its nearest neighbor begins to boom.
The gap increases to about 3% by the third year of the boom. Performing calculations analogous
to those discussed above for the economic importance of the average contagion effect show that
spillovers could account for nearly two-thirds of the jump in prices at the beginning of booms in
the most elastically supplied markets. Basic economics suggests that any contagion effects would
be more likely to be capitalized in the inelastically supplied markets, ceteris paribus, so this
outcome may seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, all else is not constant in this case.
It turns out that a disproportionately large share of these markets are large coastal metropolitan
areas with relatively small neighbors.33 So, at least some of the variation we document by degree
of supply elasticity could have been driven by the size results just discussed.34
D. Mechanisms

32

Saiz’s supply elasticity estimates are available for only 76 of our metropolitan areas, so we start with a smaller
sample for this particular analysis.
33
Included in this most inelastic tercile are the metropolitan areas of Barnstable Town, MA, Boston-CambridgeQuincy, MA-NH, Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT, Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH, Deltona-Daytona BeachOrmond Beach, FL, Eugene-Springfield, OR, Jacksonville, FL, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA, New
Haven-Milford, CT, New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA, Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura,
CA, Palm Bay-Melboune-Titusville, FL, Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA, Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL,
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA, San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA,
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA, Sarasota-Bradenton-Venice, FL, Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA, Tampa-St. PetersburgClearwater, FL, and Vallejo-Fairfield, CA. Each of these areas also has one of the 99 markets in our sample as its
closest market.
34
We also investigated whether contagion effects varied by the relative timing of booms in order to see if contagion
impacts occurred primarily when the focal market itself was booming. Appendix Figure 1 shows a histogram of the
difference between the timing of the boom of the focal MSA and its closest neighbor. There is wide variation in
timing of the booms of these pairs of markets. We find that contagion effect seems concentrated in focal MSAs that
were already booming when the closest neighbor started to boom. This result suggests salience being a feature of the
contagion effect. But as with the heterogeneity by supply elasticity, relative timing is correlated with other factors,
such as market size.
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In this subsection, we investigate some of the potential mechanisms that could account
for the influence of a near neighbor’s boom on house prices in the focal market. We are
particularly interested in whether our contagion effects are fundamentally-based in the sense
discussed in Section II. If not, the relevance of our results for policy makers is increased, as they
well may want to reevaluate their past practice of not intervening in response to asset booms in
housing markets if their spread is based on some type of irrational exuberance or otherwise
mistaken expectations.
We begin by asking whether there are visible economic changes in the focal market that
may be driven by the neighboring market boom. We then alter our baseline specification to
account for these potential fundamental drivers. Four fundamentals are investigated, with each
having received prominent mention in previous academic research or by policy makers and the
popular press. They are focal market income, mortgage market activity, net migration flows into
the focal market and the share of house ‘flips’ in overall market sales. Table 5 reports results
using these local market traits as the dependent variable in a specification similar to that in
equation (3), with one difference being that here we include MSA fixed effects rather than own
price lags.
Column 1 reports estimates for focal market income, where income is defined as the
average income for all mortgage applicants in that market and quarter. If what is driving our
contagion result is a real spillover such as focal market income going up because of boom in a
nearby market, then we should see it changing along the timeline of the neighbor’s boom. Table
5’s results show that there is a jump from zero to 1% in Relative Year [1], but this impact is not
precisely estimated (the t-statistic is 1.3). The results are similar for the second and third relative
years. It is only at least four years after the nearest neighbor booms that we see focal market
income higher by a statistically significant amount. One would not want to interpret these
coefficients as proving that contagion does not operate via spillovers onto focal market income,
but they also provide no robust evidence to the contrary.
The next two columns investigate whether the contagion effect might operate through
credit markets in some fashion. We approach this question by examining two aspects of credit
lender activities. First, we investigate whether the mortgage lender bases become more similar
during and after the nearest neighbor booms. The intuition is that if lenders observe a boom in
that neighbor, they might increase their activity in the focal market for reasons just discussed in
20

Section II. We use a proportional index to measure lender similarity.35 Second, we investigate
whether lenders speed up mortgage lending during and after the closest neighbor booms by
calculating the rate at which each lender increases mortgage issuance in the focal market. The
regression results in Column 2 and 3 indicate that on average, both lender similarity and lending
amount largely are unaffected by the housing boom of the nearest neighbor.36 Therefore, based
on our two measures of lender activities, we did not find robust and material role of lenders in
causing contagion.37
The fourth and fifth columns report analogous specifications using net migration between
two MSAs (which uses IRS data on annual tax records) and focal market flippers (based on the
fraction of transactions conducted by speculators) as the dependent variable. Both sets of results
show no discernible effect before or after the beginning of the nearest neighbor’s housing
boom.38
The fact that only focal market income shows any correlation with the timeline of the
nearest neighbor’s boom, especially its beginning, indicates that these fundamental factors are
unlikely to be able to account for our estimated contagion elasticity. Table 6 provides additional
support for this conclusion with alternative specifications similar to our baseline equation (3) that
use (log) focal market price as the dependent variable. The first column reports results from a

35

∑ |
This lender similary index is calculated as 1
|, where m and n are the market shares of lender l in
the focal and the nearest neighbor markets, respectively. A value of zero implies no similarity, while a value of one
means that each lender has the same shares in both markets.
36
We also found that lending amount by subprime lenders also does not respond to the neighbor’s boom. If we
restrict the analysis to the top 5 lenders with the highest lending amount for each market, we observe a jump in
lender similarity index in Relative Year [1]. However, this result is not robust when we go from top 5 to top 10 or
top 3 lenders. Including only top lenders also leads to a jump in lending growth rate in Relative Year [2] (the
coefficient is around 0.5), but not in Relative Year [1]. However, lending growth also is higher before neighbor’s
boom, with coefficients on Relative Year [-1] and Relative Year [-2] being in the range of 0.2-0.4. Given this
noticeable pre-trend, it is difficult to come to any conclusion that major credit lenders are the channel in
disseminating positive housing market shocks.
37
This average result, however, does not exclude the possibility of major credit lenders responding to neighbor’s
booms in other dimensions. The increase in similarity index among top lenders and the dip in their lending amount
right at neighbor’s boom may suggest some bank-level spillovers or substitution effects going on across markets. To
fully understand the role of credit markets in this contagion context would require a closer examination of a full
spectrum of lender behaviors, including those at the corporate level (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, and shocks to
other business sectors of the lenders), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
38
We also investigated the shares of experienced and inexperienced speculators, respectively. Speculators are
defined as experienced if having flipped at least four homes during the sample period, or inexperienced if otherwise.
We did not find significant jumps in either experienced or inexperienced flippers when the closest neighbor begins
its boom. However, the market share of experienced flippers declined by up to 0.5 percentage point (which is
statistically significant) since two years after the neighbor booms, which is in line with those types of flippers being
more sophisticated in timing the housing cycle and maximizing their return (Bayer et al., 2011).
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model that includes focal market fundamental controls and the log average price of near
neighbors on the right-hand side, in addition to the standard controls from the baseline
specification in Table 2. Our fundamental controls are local incomes, migration, subprime and
FHA lending market shares, percentage of speculative buyers, percent minority, average LTV,
average square footage, and the local unemployment rate. Note that these new estimates are very
similar to the baseline results presented in Table 2. Controlling for these fundamentals does not
change the magnitudes or time pattern of estimated contagion effects very much, indicating that
the spatial spillovers are not being transmitted via the fundamentals that we consider here.
Thus far, we have abstracted from expectations of future fundamental factors, effectively
treating actors as myopic. The second column of each panel in Table 6 begins to address this
issue by adding four leads of own market income to the previous specification. Effectively, this
presumes that local residents can fully predict the path of local incomes over the next four
quarters. The inclusion of such stylized expectations does not change the estimated contagion
effect. The third and final column of each panel reports results from adding four quarterly leads
of all fundamentals, not just income. Once again, the magnitudes of the point estimates as well
as the time pattern are relatively unchanged.
That we find no evidence that these spatial spillovers work through fundamental factors
has potentially important implications for how policy makers should view intervention during
housing booms. To the extent the booms are spread by non-fundamental forces (e.g., some type
of Keynesian/Shillerian irrational exuberance), they might want to try to stop them from growing
in scale and scope. Of course, fundamentals could encompass more than just income growth (or
speculators, migration, etc.), and we would like to control for expectations as generally as
possible. One extreme way that does eliminate the impact of contagion is to presume that the
future path of price growth in the focal market is known with certainty in every period. In this
context, the effect of a nearby housing boom on future prices in the focal MSA is immediately
known and expectations are simply equal to the future value of price growth in the focal area.
Adding four quarterly price growth leads completely wipes out the contagion impact. This
indicates that the spillover could be operating primarily via expectations. Unless those
expectations are based solely on fundamentals, the implications just discussed still hold. The
likelihood that contagion operates via effects on expectations makes that issue an essential
component of future research, but that clearly is beyond the scope of the current paper.
22

V.

Additional Analysis: Instrumental Variable, Extensive Margin, and Bust

A. Alternative Model and Instrumental Variable
In this subsection, we relate price changes in the focal MSA with price changes from all
neighbors, not just the nearest two. This direct estimation of the contagion elasticity has the
benefit of allowing us to use an instrumental variable strategy to deal with omitted factors. Also,
by interacting the price changes of the closest neighbor with a set of relative year dummies, we
are able to explore how this effect varies over the course of a neighbor market’s housing boom.
The downside of this approach is that the specification does not allow us to fully observe the
dynamic pattern of contagion, as we restrict the effect of neighboring price changes to operate
through only one quarterly lag.
More specifically, we group neighboring locations into bins based on their distance from
the focal market and estimate the following equation:
4
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is the lagged average price growth among neighboring MSAs falling into bin

for focal MSA m. In theory, we could allow each neighbor to be in its own bin based on how
close it was to the focal area. However, that turns out not to be practical due to data limitations,
so we bin neighbors based on distance rankings 1,2, 3-5, 6-10, 11-50, and 51+.39 This makes the
coefficients,

, the elasticity of focal area current price growth with respect to the average of

lagged price growth among neighbors in bin k. For the closest neighbor, we further interact the
lagged price growth variable with relative years to that neighbor’s boom -- resulting in a
coefficient,

, for each of the neighbor’s relative years, as shown in the first term on the right-

hand side of (4) Relative year 0 again is the omitted category in all specifications. Thus, the

39

As in our main regressions, we include an indicator for whether we have price data for a given bin and interact
this indicator with the relevant lagged average price variable. Results are qualitatively similar when we drop MSAs
with missing neighbors’ price data and also when we calculate distances using only the 99 MSAs for which we have
data.
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coefficients on the lagged average price growth of the closest neighbor are interpreted relative to
the effect in the 12-month period prior to that neighbor’s boom.
One concern is that, even after including lags of the dependent variable (the third term on
the right-hand side of (4)) and area-by-time fixed effects (the

,

vector), there still could be

some common omitted factors helping drive the observed correlations. Ideally, we would like an
instrumental variable that shifts the lagged average price growth of the focal MSA’s closest
neighbor, but does not directly affect the contemporaneous appreciation rate in the focal market
itself. If taken literally, our estimating equation implies that further lags of the neighbor’s price
growth could potentially serve as an instrument because those variables would only affect the
focal market’s contemporaneous price growth through their impact on the lagged neighbor’s
price growth. This leads us to instrument for the lagged average price growth in each group of
neighbors using one further lag of the average price growth among the relevant neighboring
areas.40
Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (4). Once again, there is a clear pattern
that shows a shift in the importance of contagion right after the first year that close neighbors
boom. Estimates for the first year of each of the neighbor’s boom are 0.148, or approximately
half the elasticity derived from our baseline estimates when considering the first year of the
housing boom. Estimates for subsequent relative years fade relatively slowly, reaching a 0.1
elasticity that is similar to the baseline results.
B. A Hazard Model of Housing Boom Contagion
Our work above focuses entirely on the magnitude of contagion. In this section, we give
empirical content to the extensive margin on the timing of booms that was suggested by Figure 1.
We estimate simple hazard models to see if the probability of a focal market booming is
influenced by the fact that neighbors boomed previously, after controlling for a host of covariates
that also might account for the beginning of a boom.
Recent work on technology diffusion provides an intuitive way to generate contagion that
is particularly appropriate for the specifications estimated in this subsection. In some of that
40

It turns out that the second quarterly lag of neighbor’s price growth has a small and statistically insignificant
impact on the focal MSA price appreciation, after controlling for all other covariates. In the specifications that
interact the lagged average price growth of the neighbors with the focal MSA relative year indicators, we also
interact lagged neighbors income growth and the second lag of neighbor’s price growth with the focal area’s relative
year and include the full set of these interactions as instruments.
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research, contagion refers to a process in which people adopt a new technology when they
physically meet with others who have already adopted it (Young (2009); Comin et al. (2012)).
In our context of housing booms, this suggests that the probability of one metropolitan area
entering a housing boom increases with its connection to other such areas that already have
boomed. A standard assumption is that the intensity of the connection decays in distance
between MSA pairs at a constant rate. Given that assumption, it is straightforward to generate
the following two conclusions from a simple model: (a) if MSA
, that increases the hazard of MSA

enters a housing boom at time

having a housing boom at time

contagious effect is larger the closer is MSA m to MSA q.

1; and (b) this
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To investigate these implications, we begin by estimating whether the beginning of a
boom in neighboring MSAs affects the hazard of focal MSAs entering a boom. We consider the
following proportional hazard model relating the hazard of each focal MSA entering a boom in
quarter ,

, to a series of factors as noted in the following equation.
5

exp

Δ

,

Δ

,

,

∈

The primary coefficients of interest are γk ’s on the variable ∑
number of MSAs among neighbors in bin

,

∈

which reflects the

that began their boom in the previous quarter. We

allow for multiple groups of neighbors (indexed by k) based on how close they are to the focal
MSA. As before, we rank each focal MSA’s neighbors and group them into
exclusive bins based on these ranks, with
MSA m. A positive coefficient

mutually

denoting the set of neighbors in bin

for focal

would suggest a positive contagion effect. If the contagion

effect decays with distance, we should also expect the

’s of closer neighbors to be larger than

those of farther away neighbors. As with the estimation of magnitudes, we control for many
potential correlates of a housing boom through the vector Δ

,

.

We use the same bins as in Table 7. Table 8 then lists summary statistics on the number
of booms started across different bins of neighbors. The very small means for the bins
41

See Appendix A2 for a more formal presentation of how that approach generates specifications of the type we
estimate in this section.
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containing five or fewer markets document how unlikely it is that even a single boom began in
any given quarter among the few markets in those bins. Thus, the lagged value of this variable
(∑

∈

,

) will contain many zeroes, making it difficult to estimate precise contagion

effects about the timing of the beginning of local market booms. Nevertheless, we use these bins
initially given the differential importance of the two closest neighbors in the contagion
magnitude results and discuss findings later that use larger bin sizes.
Our baseline results are from a common parametric specification, the exponential model,
which assumes a flat baseline hazard

exp

. Implied changes in the probability of

the focal area experiencing a boom this quarter (i.e., the hazard ratio) from one more neighbor
having experienced a boom last quarter are reported in Table 9. The unconditional hazard,
which is reported in column 1, indicates that the probability of the focal MSA booming this
quarter more than triples if one more of its two physically closest neighbors boomed last quarter.
The coefficients on the next three bins (Neighbors[3-5], Neighbors[6-10], and Neighbors[11-50])
are much smaller and none is statistically significant at conventional levels. That the lack of
significance might be due to the nature of these variables having so little natural variation is
indicated by the statistically significant impact of the group of furthest away markets
(Neighbors[51+]). Still, it is lagged booms among the two closest neighbors that have the
strongest correlation with a contemporary boom in the focal market.
Controlling for a standard set of covariates lowers the estimated effect substantially, as
reported in column two. This time, the coefficients on the bins for all but the two closest
neighbors are close to or below 1, indicating they have no positive impact on the probability of
the focal market booming this period. And, the coefficient on the bin for the two closest
neighbors falls by more than half. Even the 49% increase in probability implied by the
coefficients on Neighbors[1-2] is not statistically significant, although that could be due to the
nature of our data as discussed above. This conclusion is supported by the findings reported in
column 3, which uses a Weibull hazard.42 It reports a statistically significant correlation between
lagged booms in very near neighbors and contemporaneous booms in the focal markets. These
results show that if one of the two closest neighbors boomed last quarter, the probability of the
focal market booming this quarter is about 70%-80% higher. The standardized marginal effect is
42

A Weibull hazard model presumes a monotonic baseline hazard
exp
different functional forms to see if the pattern of results was materially affected.

. We experimented with
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smaller, of course, given the 0.18 standard deviation on Neighbors[1-2]. Using the middle of the
range estimate from the Weibull hazard model, it is about 30% (i.e., 1.69*0.18).
These results only allow for a contagion effect from a single quarterly lag of neighbors’
booms. We also estimated models that allowed for an increase in the number of booming
neighbors over the past 6 to 12 months. There is a modest increase in the hazard (to 32%) if we
allow for booms in any of the previous two quarters, but the result does not increase further if we
allow for booms in any of the previous four quarters. Thus, the spatial effect estimated here
appears to happen fairly quickly. This is also consistent with the elasticity estimates reported
above.
The magnitude of the economic impact is hard to gauge on its own. We can gain some
useful perspective by comparing it to the impacts on the hazard ratio of standard deviation
changes in other variables. Among the underlying controls, the focal market’s current income
growth and previous quarter’s price growth also were highly statistically significant predictors of
a higher probability of booming. A one standard deviation higher own income growth rate is
associated with about a 28% higher probability of the focal market booming. A one standard
deviation higher rate of lagged house price appreciation is much more influential, as it is
associated with an 87% higher hazard ratio. Thus, the standardized marginal effect of a boom in
a very close neighbor appears to be quite influential and on a par with a standard deviation
increase in its own income growth rate.43 And, that we still find a meaningful influence of
lagged near neighbors after controlling for everything else shows that the implications of the
‘eyeball econometrics’ from Figure 1 are not entirely due to many other potentially important
factors.44
C. Was There Contagion During the Spread of the Housing Bust?

43

The growth rate in the percentage of buyers with mortgages insured by the FHA also is a very powerful control.
As expected, it is associated with a lower probability of booming. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in
that share is associated with an 86% fall in the hazard. Other statistically significant controls include the growth rate
of the metropolitan area unemployment rate, as well as the second and fourth quarterly lags of focal market house
price appreciation.
44
Conditional hazard model estimates using more aggregate bins (Neighbors[1-10], Neighbors[11-50] and
Neighbors[51+]) do not show any impact on the timing of the beginning of the boom in focal markets. Averaging
across the ten closest neighbors masks the distinct impact of the two closest neighbors. As in the analysis of the
magnitude of contagion, only the closest neighbors appear to matter.
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Our results indicate that contagion played a statistically and economically meaningful
role in the timing and magnitude of the spread of housing booms across metropolitan areas. For
completeness, we also explored the extent to which the same is true for the bust. In many
respects, analysis of the bust is more challenging. One of the challenges is in deciding how it is
defined and determined. We choose it to be the quarter in which nominal house prices peaked in
the relevant MSA. While that may be intuitive, it also is much more ad hoc than our definition
of the beginning of the boom, which is based on an external prediction of an economic model.
Another challenge is that the bust was much more temporally correlated across markets than was
the boom. This can be seen in Figure 3 which plots histograms of the quarters in which local
market booms and busts began. This plot includes all markets that had a statistically significant
boom. Note that the temporal concentration of busts is much greater, with every market
experiencing a peak in prices within a 2.5-3 year period from mid-2005 through early 2008.
Figure 4 then provides more geographical detail with its plots of market busts over time.
The first panel in this figure is identical to the first panel in Figure 1 and plots the MSAs for
which we never estimate a statistically significant boom. The remaining panels show the timing
of the bust among those MSAs that experienced booms. Unlike Figure 1’s plots of the time line
of metropolitan area booms, we see markets in all parts of the country, not just in coastal
California and upper New England, with early price peaks between 2003-2005. The largest
fraction of those peaks happening in last two quarters of 2005. Thus, the beginning of the bust is
more national in scope than was the beginning of the boom. The subsequent plots in this figure
do show a spreading out of the ‘busts’ to nearby markets. In the west, prices tended to peak
earlier in interior markets and then spread to the coast. In Florida, the first price peaks were in
markets on both coasts of that state. Peaking then occurred in a few other coastal markets before
spreading to interior markets.
While this has the flavor of contagion seen in the start of the boom, more detailed
analysis shows this not to be the case. For example, Table 10 reports hazard model estimates
akin to those in Table 9, except here the dependent variable is the start of the bust, not the start of
the boom. Unconditionally, lagged busts of neighbors are positively correlated with
contemporary busts in focal markets, and near neighbors matter the most (column 1). However,
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column 2 of this table shows this conclusion of ‘eyeball econometrics’ from Figure 4 does not
survive the inclusion of covariates.45
In Table 11 we estimated price specifications for the bust akin to those in Table 2. First,
using geographic distance, we do not see significant jumps in the magnitude of the contagion
effect in relative year one. But focal prices decline by 1.2% and 3.8% in relative years two and
three respectively. Results using economic distance follow a similar pattern. When compared to
the magnitude of the price decline in the neighboring MSA, we find an elasticity of around 0.15.
Those results are surprisingly similar to the ones observed during the spread of the housing boom.

VI.

Conclusions

We provide estimates of the role of contagion in the most recent American housing boom
and bust. We find a statistically and economically meaningful role for contagion during the
beginning and spread of the housing boom, and mixed evidence of contagion for the bust. Our
key results are as follows. First, contagion impacts arise only from the very closest neighbors.
There is no evidence of spillovers associated with more distant neighbors. The elasticity of focal
market prices with respect to changes in its nearest neighbor’s prices is in the range of 0.10-0.27.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest this is large enough to account for up to 30% of the
jump in prices at the beginning of local booms, on average.
Finally, we found that local fundamentals and expectations of future fundamentals have
very limited ability to account for our estimated contagion effect. That contagion transmission is
not associated with local fundamentals suggests a potential role for non-rational forces. That is
an issue in urgent need of new research because, if contagion does reflect some type of irrational
exuberance, policy makers may want to rethink their past policy of not intervening to stop the
spread of asset booms in housing.

45

All markets are used in this particular estimation, including those that did not boom. The results are virtually
identical if we restrict the sample to those that did boom.
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Figure 1: Timing of Housing Boom by MSA
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Figure 2: Las Vegas’ Constant Growth Rate Before Booming

Source: Ferreira and Gyourko (2011, Figure 2)
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Figure 3: Histograms of the Beginning of Booms and Busts, MSAs
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Figure 4: Timing of Housing Busts by MSA
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean
Std. Dev.
25th Percentile 75th Percentile
Price Index
132
52
96
156
Average Income ($1000's)
75
26
56
86
Percent Minority
.18
.13
.075
.25
Percent Speculators
.054
.032
.031
.071
Percent FHA Insured
.096
.097
.014
.14
Percent Subprime Lenders
.14
.075
.087
.19
Average LTV
.73
.1
.69
.79
Average Square Footage
1672
161
1584
1764
Unemployment Rate
5.9
3.3
4
6.6
Net Migration
266
6878
-668
1408
N.
5043
Columns present descriptive statistics for all MSA-quarter observations in our sample.
Observation counts in regressions will vary depending on the specification and control
variables used.
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Table 2: The impact of nearest neighbor housing boom on log focal market price

Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
Nearest Neighbors' Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]
Relative Year [-1]
Relative Year [1]
Relative Year [2]
Relative Year [3]
Relative Year [>=4]

Neighbor1

Neighbor 2

Neighbor Boom Neighbor Boom Neighbor Boom Neighbor Boom
Significant
Insignificant
Significant
Insignificant
-.003029
(.004662)
-.000076
(.003184)
.008688**
(.004191)
.00977**
(.004236)
.008542*
(.004985)
.005247
(.004774)

-.003357
(.01543)
-.03365**
(.01526)
.00297
(.00563)
-.02102*
(.01091)
-.01698***
(.005502)
-.006412
(.004954)

-.00013
(.005425)
.002323
(.005658)
.006096
(.006421)
.01487***
(.005638)
.01029
(.006735)
.004154
(.00551)

.0114
(.008886)
-.003854
(.006118)
.000575
(.00634)
.002127
(.01006)
.001398
(.005476)
.005613
(.005984)

Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Y
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Y
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Y
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Y
N
4584
Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest or
second closest geographic neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of
the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. Specification also includes dummy variable(s) indicating
whether the closest neighbor(s) are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census division by
year level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and

Table 3: The impact of nearest neighbor housing boom on nearest neighbor log price

Dep. Var: Log Nearest Neighbor's Price
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]

.02815**
(.01333)
Relative Year [-1]
.01751
(.0153)
Relative Year [1]
.03224
(.02066)
Relative Year [2]
.06701***
(.02199)
Relative Year [3]
.08197***
(.02188)
Relative Year [>=4]
.1179***
(.01976)
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Y
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Y
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Y
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Y
N
3583
Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for
indicated relative years of the closest geographic neighbor.
Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the
boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category.
Relative year effects are interacted with a dummy for whether
the neighboring market had a statistically significant and
positive break point and only the coefficients for the MSAs that
actually had a boom are reported here. Specification also
includes dummy variables indicating whether the closest
neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the
Census Division by year level and are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and
***, respectively.

Table 4: Heterogeneity in the impact of nearest neighbor housing boom on log focal market price
Distance
Relative Size
Focal Market Elasticity
Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Inelastic
Elastic
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years <= 40 Miles > 40 Miles Focal Larger Nbr. Larger
Relative Year [-2]
-.004239
-.001194
-.001048
-.005334
-.001111
.001165
(.004747)
(.005436)
(.004448)
(.005874)
(.006739)
(.007681)
Relative Year [-1]
-.001823
.001363
-.001269
.000373
-.003162
.003788
(.003802)
(.004727)
(.003668)
(.003878)
(.004464)
(.006904)
Relative Year [1]
.008405
.008564
.00461
.01288**
.00769
.01877*
(.005087)
(.006187)
(.00417)
(.005703)
(.007545)
(.0103)
Relative Year [2]
.008409
.009215
.01116***
.009466*
.008632
.02683**
(.005425)
(.006344)
(.004208)
(.005423)
(.005739)
(.01069)
Relative Year [3]
.008389
.005968
.007858
.0104**
.00978
.02897***
(.007093)
(.005006)
(.005809)
(.004913)
(.007775)
(.0102)
Relative Year [>=4]
-5.5e-06
.0118**
.005298
.008329
.01061*
.01055
(.005004)
(.005328)
(.004551)
(.005509)
(.006347)
(.01232)
Y
Y
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Y
Y
Y
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Y
Y
Y
Four Lags of Own Log Price
Y
Y
Y
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Y
3586
4647
4584
N
Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic
neighbor interacted with dummies for whether the focal market is in the category indicated in the column header for
various measures of heterogeneity. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring
MSA and is the omitted category. All specifications also include dummy variables indicating whether the closest
neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Table 5: The impact of nearest neighbor housing boom on focal market fundamentals using geographic distance

Dependent Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Focal Market
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Lender
Lending
Net
Focal Market
Income
Similarity
Amount
Migration
Flippers
Relative Year [-2]
-0.013
.0127*
0.0205
84.43
.0078***
(.009)
(.0065)
(0.0609)
(132.6)
(0.0029)
Relative Year [-1]
-0.006
0.005
0.0572
91.49
0.0039
(.008)
(.0051)
(0.0562)
(132.9)
(0.0026)
Relative Year [1]
0.011
0.0025
0.0239
-43.23
-0.0004
(.008)
(.0039)
(0.0505)
(85.75)
(0.0032)
Relative Year [2]
0.016
-0.0015
0.0491
-93.54
-0.0012
(.0115)
(.0047)
(0.0416)
(78.01)
(0.003)
Relative Year [3]
0.0135
0.0004
-0.0230
-165.4
-0.0038
(.0132)
(.0071)
(0.0448)
(114)
(0.0031)
Relative Year [>=4]
.0229*
0.0048
0.0194
-251.6**
-0.0037
(.013)
(.0073)
(0.0618)
(101.4)
(0.0032)
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Year-by-Census Division FE
N
N
Y
Y
N
MSA FE
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Focal Market Price and LTV Growth
N
N
Y
N
N
N
4877
4219
996941
1215
4829
Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative years of the closest geographic
neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the
omitted category. All specifications also include dummy variables indicating whether the closest neighbors are in the
sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Table 6: The impact of nearest neighbor housing boom on log focal market price, controlling for local
fundamentals and expectations

Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]

-.003202
-.003899 -.002159
(.004133)
(.003979) (.004018)
Relative Year [-1]
-.000332
-.000577 .000934
(.003053)
(.003016) (.00288)
Relative Year [1]
.007821**
.008673** .007878**
(.003796)
(.003624) (.003235)
Relative Year [2]
.008964**
.01033** .008651**
(.004278)
(.004157) (.003704)
Relative Year [3]
.00804
.008275
.005047
(.005421)
(.006464) (.005994)
Relative Year [>=4]
.003512
.006228
.005626
(.004924)
(.004178) (.004507)
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Y
Y
Y
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Y
Y
Y
Four Lags of Own Log Price
Y
Y
Y
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Y
Y
Y
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
Y
Y
Y
Log Average Price of Neighbor Groups
Y
Y
Y
Four Leads of Own Income
N
Y
Y
Four Leads of All Fundamental Controls
N
N
Y
N
4538
4142
4142
Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy variable for indicated relative
years of the closest geographic neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates the 12 month
period preceding the boom of the neighboring MSA and is the omitted category. All
specifications also include dummy variables indicating whether the closest
neighbors are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the Census Division by
year level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Table 7: The impact of nearest neighbor price changes on focal market price changes—IV Results

Dep. Var: Focal Market Price Changes
OLS
IV
0.139*
-0.045
(0.072)
(0.228)
Relative Year [-1]
0.094**
0.041
(0.042)
(0.131)
Relative Year [1]
0.135***
0.148***
(0.038)
(0.037)
Relative Year [2]
0.102**
0.125***
(0.040)
(0.035)
Relative Year [3]
0.090**
0.090**
(0.039)
(0.037)
Relative Year [>=4]
0.089***
0.088***
(0.027)
(0.028)
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Y
Y
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Y
Y
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Y
Y
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Y
Y
N
4156
4131
Notes: Table reports the results from a regression of annualized focal
market price growth rates on the lag of the nearest neighbor's
annualized price growth interacted with dummies for the indicated
relative years of the neighboring market. In the second column, lagged
neighbor's price growth is instrumented using one further lag.Standard
errors are clustered at the Census Division by year level and are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Nearest Neighbor Price Changes
Relative Year [-2]
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Table 8: Summary statistics on Lagged Number of Booms for the Hazard Estimation

Lagged Number of New Booms
Mean
Sd
Min
Max
% Zero Boom
Neighbors [1-2]
0.0297
0.1777
0
2
97.20%
Neighbors [3-5]
0.0393
0.2058
0
3
96.20%
Neighbors [6-10]
0.0626
0.2692
0
3
94.30%
Neighbors [1-10]
0.1317
0.4246
0
5
89.00%
Neighbors [11-50]
0.3051
0.6079
0
7
76.20%
Neighbors [51+]
1.3055
1.6134
0
6
39.50%
Note: Neighbors are ranked with respect to their geographic distance from the focal MSA.

Table 9: Hazard Model Estimates of MSA Neighbors on the Probability of Booming by Geographic
Distance
Unconditional
Baseline Results
Weibull
Hazard
(Proportional Hazard) Hazard
Independent Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Lagged Number of New Booms
Neighbors[1-2]
3.49***
1.49
1.69*
Neighbors[3-5]
1.31
0.79
0.84
Neighbors[6-10]
1.41
1.26
1.25
Neighbors[11-50]
1.14
0.86
0.8
Neighbors[51+]
1.23***
1.02
1.05
Other Controls
Lagged % MSAs that Already Boomed
N
Y
Y
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
N
Y
Y
Four Lags of Focal Market Price Growth
N
Y
Y
Census Region FE
N
Y
Y
N
2114
2114
2114
Log-Likelihood
-29.93
29.43
34.14
Note: Implied Hazard Ratios are reported along with indicators of statistical significance of the
underlying regression coefficients. Significance levels 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, **
and ***, respectively.
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Table 10: Hazard Model Estimates of MSA Neighbors on the Probability of Busting
Unconditional Proportional Hazard
Hazard
with Controls
Independent Variables
(1)
(2)
Lagged Number of New Busts
Neighbors[1-2]
1.66*
0.96
Neighbors[3-5]
1.14
0.74
Neighbors[6-10]
1.55**
1.08
Neighbors[11-50]
1.12*
0.96
Neighbors[51+]
1.18***
1
Other Controls
Lagged % MSA that Already Busted
N
Y
Focal Market Fundamental Controls
N
Y
Four Lags of Focal Market Price Growth
N
Y
Census Region FE
N
Y
N
3,637
3,637
Log-Likelihood
2.181
100.1
Note: We define the time of housing bust as the quarter when price peaks in our
sample period. Implied hazard ratios are reported along with indicators of
statistical significance of the underlying regression coefficients. Significance levels
10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively.
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Table 11: The impact of nearest neighbor housing bust on log focal market price

Dep. Var: Log Focal Market Price
Nearest Neighbor Relative Years
Relative Year [-2]

-.01169**
(.004509)
Relative Year [-1]
-.003846
(.003101)
Relative Year [1]
-.006359
(.005119)
Relative Year [2]
-.01228**
(.006151)
Relative Year [3]
-.03804***
(.007463)
Quarter-by-Census Division FE
Y
Focal Market Relative Year FE
Y
Four Lags of Focal Log Price
Y
Neighbor-2 Relative Year FE
Y
N
5178
Notes: Cells represent the coefficient on the dummy
variable for indicated relative years of the closest
geographic neighbor. Relative year 0 indicates the 12
month period preceding the bust of the neighboring MSA
and is the omitted category. All specifications also include
dummy variables indicating whether the closest neighbors
are in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the
Census Division by year level and are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Appendix A1: Estimating Multiple Breakpoints
In estimating the break points, we allow for the possibility that a given market might experience
more than one housing boom during the course of our sample period. Our method is recursive in that
we first test for the existence of one break point against the null hypothesis of zero. Given the
1 break points against the

existence of at least one break point, we can then test the hypothesis of
null of

using the results from Bai (1999). Bai and Perron (1998) show that the test for one break is

consistent in the presence of multiple breaks, which is what allows for this sequential estimation
procedure.
More specifically, let 0

,

⋯

,

1 mark the proportions of the sample generated by

the

break points estimated under the null hypothesis for MSA i. For technical reasons, we require

that

,

,
,

,

,

,

,

,

for some small

1, … ,

,

where we define

0,

,

,

1. Further, let

1. The likelihood ratio test compares the maximum of the likelihood

ratio obtained when allowing for

1 breaks to that from only allowing for

. The distribution of

this likelihood ratio statistic is given by
1.1

1

1

∈

,

,

,

,

which we calculate by recursive application of the method provided in Estrella (2003).
We apply this procedure to test for the existence of two break points against the null of one as
well as three against the null of only two among those MSAs for which we find at least two
statistically significant break points. There are some noteworthy practical issues involved with
carrying out this procedure. We have not until this point said where the sample proportions
,

,

,

,

,

come from. In practice, we restrict the full sample period for each MSA to lie between

the first quarter in the data and the peak of price growth. We then do not allow any break points to lie
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in either the first or last two quarters of this sample for each MSA. This determines the fractions
and

,

,

which, because different MSAs have a different number of quarters, will vary across areas.
When estimating multiple break points, we further require that any two break points be at least

four quarters apart. This determines the fraction

,

which, again, will vary across areas due to

differing sample sizes. Because of these restrictions, we are not able calculate p-values for many
MSAs in the case of multiple breaks. The reason for this can be seen from the expression in (A1.1).
Because this expression requires that

0.5, we must require that

,
,

,

0.5 for all . This

implies that we will not be able to calculate p-values for the two-break case in MSAs (neighborhoods)
where the first break is less than

,

/0.5 from the beginning of the sample period. Naturally, this

restriction is more burdensome when trying to calculate p-values in the three break case.
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Appendix A2: A Hazard Model of Housing Boom Contagion
Consider an economy with

metro areas. The probability of MSA

entering a housing boom

increases if it “meets” other MSAs which already have entered a housing boom. Assume

is the

frequency of such a meeting and that the connection between MSA pairs decays in distance at rate .
Following Comin, et. al. (2012), we can write MSA
time

’s probability of not entering a housing boom at

conditional on not having a housing boom in time as
2.1

0, ,

0, ,

ℎ

denotes the distance between MSA

where

2.2

By assumption,

0,

0, ,

∑

and MSA . Taking

,

ℎ

0, ,

∑

→ 0, we have

0, ,

0, ∀

if MSA

some MSA enters a boom, equation (A2.2) implies that

enters a housing boom at time . As long as
, ,

0, so that the hazard of entering a

housing boom increases over time. To consider the contagious effect of housing booms, suppose MSA
booms at time . That increases the hazard of MSA
2.3

ln

0, ,
0, ,

∑

having a boom because

0, ,

In addition, the contagious effect of a housing boom in MSA

0
decreases over geographical distance,

because

2.4

0,

,
, ,

∑

0

In sum, this framework provides two relevant implications for our purposes:
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Implication 1: The fact that MSA

enters a housing boom at time increases the hazard of MSA

having a housing boom at time

1.

Implication 2: Contagion effect in Implication 1 becomes larger when MSA

is closer to MSA m.
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Appendix Figure 1: Histogram of number of quarters between timing of the booms of focal markets
and nearest neighbors

Note: The level of observation is the MSA-quarter.

Appendix Figure 2: Histogram of percentage difference in population of focal markets and nearest
neighbors

Note: The level of observation is the MSA-quarter.
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